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Overview
The focus of this study is an empirical
examination of some causes of revolution.l
While prior studies have delineated dimen-
sions of conflict behavior within nations
(Rummel, 1963, 1966, 1967; Tanter, 1965,
1966) in order to discover the variables
most representative of internal conflict, a
purpose of the present inquiry is to discover
their theoretical significance. A typology of
revolution is presented and two possible
causes of revolution-changes in economic
development and level of education-are
examined regarding the extent of their asso-
ciation with certain characteristics of revo-
lution. Regional differences are found which
imply a fundamental distinction between at
least two of the categories in the typology.
Finally, hypotheses are offered to account
for some of the findings of this study.
A Categorization of Revolutions
Prior to a discussion of theoretical signifi-
cance, it may be useful to inquire into the
meaning of revolution itself. This exercise
in definition appears necessary primarily be-
cause prior usage of the term has been
somewhat ambiguous. To the Hegelian, the
revolutionary idea is equated with irresist-
ible change-a manifestation of the world
spirit in an unceasing quest for its own ful-
fillment. Similarly, the Marxist, although
opposed to Hegelian idealism, sees revolu-
tion as a product of irresistible historical
forces, which culminate in a struggle be-
tween the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
Hannah Arendt (1965, pp. 34-40), on the
other hand, interprets the revolutionary ex-
perience as a kind of restoration, whereby
the insurgents attempt to restore liberties
and privileges which were lost as the result
of the government’s temporary lapse into
despotism. Indeed, aspects of the American
Revolution as well as some recent anti-
colonial revolutions may be amenable to
Arendt’s interpretation. The insurgents
might view the colonial elite as strangers
who have usurped the freedoms which,
1 This study is a part of a series on revolu-
tions and their implications for international re-
lations and especially some consequences for
international business communities. Acknowl-
edgments are due to Harold Guetzkow of the
International Relations Program at Northwestern
University for his suggestions during formative
stages of this inquiry. Thanks are due to the
Ford Foundation for a fellowship given to the
junior author and to the National Science Foun-
dation for its assistance to the senior author.
Helpful comments were made by Richard A.
Brody, James C. Davies, and Robert C. North.
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TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF FOUR TYPES OF REVOLUTION
mythically or otherwise, once belonged to
the people now in revolt.
Tocqueville (1955, p. 8), on the other
hand, has employed a more empirical ap-
proach to the problem of revolution, and has
defined it as an overthrow of the legally con-
stituted elite, which initiated a period of in-
tense social, political, and economic change.
Crane Brinton (1952, pp. 3-4) has continued
this empirical thrust by differentiating be-
tween the coup d6tat, as a simple replace-
ment of one elite by another, and major
revolutions such as the French or Russian,
which were accompanied by social, political,
and economic changes. Similarly, with re-
spect to Latin America, George Blanksten
(1962, p. 72) suggests that we should dis-
tinguish between the coup d6tat and revo-
lutions such as the Mexican experience,
which eventually had profound conse-
quences for the structure of that society.
The distinction between two forms of
revolution may provide a basis for the de-
velopment of further classifications. For
example, Harold Lasswell and Abraham
Kaplan (1950, p. 252) present a further re-
finement in the classification of revolution
by the introduction of a three-category ty-
pology in which they differentiate between
palace revolutions, political revolutions, and
social revolutions. Edwin Lieuwen (1960,
pp. 22-24) constructs a similar classifica-
tion, but instead of the palace revolution he
discusses &dquo;caudillismo&dquo; (predatory milita-
rism), which is a common form of the coup
d6tat in Latin America. These three forms
of revolution appear to reflect an increasing
degree of change initiated by the successful
insurgents, and may be placed on a rank-
order of increasing political or social change.
James Rosenau, in fact, constructs such a
classification of revolution.
Personnel wars are defined by Rosenau as
those which are fought over the occupancy
of existing roles in the structure of political
authority (Rosenau, 1964, pp. 63-64). An
example of this type is the palace revolution
or Latin American caudillismo. A second
category is what Rosenau calls the authority
wars, or those in which the insurgents com-
pete not only for the occupancy of roles in
the political structure, but for their arrange-
ment as well. Struggles to replace dictator-
ships with democracies would be classified
as authority wars. The final classification is
that of the structural wars, in which the goal
of the insurgents is the introduction of social
and economic changes in the society. Wars
involving Communist factions would fall
under this heading. In addition, Rosenau
notes that structural wars contain elements
of both personnel and authority wars.
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Changes in the occupancy of government
roles, as well as the arrangement of these
roles, would automatically take place if the
insurgents were successful in a structural
war. Similarly, the authority war is person-
nel-oriented, because the arrangement of
political roles would seldom, if ever, be
altered without a change in the occupancy
of these roles. In Rosenau’s ranking of the
three types of internal war, personnel wars
would occupy the lowest rank with regard
to the degree of societal change; the au-
thority wars would occupy an intermediate
rank, and the structural wars would receive
the highest rank.
Samuel Huntington (1962, pp. 23-24)
has suggested a classification of revolution
in which four categories are enumerated:
the internal war, the revolutionary coup, the
reform coup, and the palace revolution.
Huntington’s use of the concept &dquo;internal
war&dquo; differs from the meaning attributed to
that concept in earlier systematic studies.
For that reason the term mass revolution2
will be substituted for internal war as used
by Huntington. The terms mass revolution
and palace revolution correspond respec-
tively to Rosenau’s structural and personnel
wars, while the revolutionary and reform
coups both may be placed under the head-
ing of the authority wars. Kemal Ataturk’s
revolution in Turkey, for example, illustrates
what Huntington might call a revolutionary
coup, whereas the 1955 coup in Argentina
might be classified as a reform coup. The
major difference between the two forms is
in the degree of change initiated in the
structure of the political authority. The
&dquo;Young Turks&dquo; implemented a complete re-
vision of the political authority which led to
a truncation of the Ottoman Empire and the
establishment of a republic. The revolt
against Peron, on the other hand, was an at-
tempt at reform, in that Peron’s mismanage-
ment of the economy and the dissatisfaction
of major political forces, such as the Roman
Catholic Church, led to a revolt against what
had become an oppressive political execu-
tive.
The existence of several types of revolu-
tion suggests that we might be able to isolate
different characteristics of revolution. Karl
Deutsch (1964, pp. 102-104) proposes that
the degree of mass participation in a revo-
lution, as well as its duration, may be essen-
tial to an adequate description of the revolu-
tionary experience. A third characteristic
may be the number killed as a result of the
revolution. Given a high degree of commit-
ment by the insurgents and the incumbents,
the number of persons killed both during
and after the revolution may be a measure
of intensity. This measure will be discussed
more fully at a later point. Finally, the in-
tentions of the insurgents may be critical to
the form of the revolution as well as to its
eventual outcome. If the successful insur-
gents are ideologically committed to certain
goals, then they may initiate changes in the
societal structure to effect the realization of
these goals. If, on the other hand, the in-
surgents have no particular ideological orien-
tation, then they might intend to replace the
incumbents in the structure of political au-
thority without recourse to changes in the
societal structure.
Table 1 contains a rank-order of the cate-
gories of revolution based on their position
with respect to mass participation, duration,
domestic violence, and the intentions of the
2 One may also distinguish between various
types of mass revolution. Lawrence Stone
(1966, pp. 162-63), for example, presents a
typology which differentiates among the Jac-
querie, the Anarchistic Rebellion, the Jacobin
Communist Revolution and the Militaristic Mass
Insurrection. However, a purpose of this study
is to compare the larger categories of revolution
(e.g., mass revolution vs. palace revolution)
rather than to engage in a detailed examination
of subcategories.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XI NUMBER 3
267
TABLE 2
FOUR TYPES OF REVOLUTIONa
a Unsuccessful revolutions are indicated below the the dotted line.
b The date in parentheses refers to the year in which the insurgents were either defeated or seized the roles in
the structure of political authority.
c The Algerian revolution of 1962 refers to the anti-colonial revolt of the Algerian independence movement,
whereas the French revolution of 1958 applies to the fall of the French Fourth Republic.
insurgents. We may now suggest a defini-
tion of revolution which would be designed
to include the categories in Table 1, as well
as to allow for the possibility of a continuum.
A revolution may be said to exist when a
group of insurgents illegally and/or force-
fully challenges the governmental elite for
the occupancy of roles in the structure of
political authority. A successful revolution
occurs when, as a result of a challenge to
the governmental elite, insurgents are even-
tually able to occupy principal roles within
the structure of the political authority. This
is not to say that once the insurgents have
occupied these roles, the structure of politi-
cal authority will remain unchanged. As
suggested above, changes in the personnel
of the governmental elite often are the pre-
condition for meaningful changes in the
political and social structure. If the insur-
gents intend major political and social
changes, they must first occupy these roles
within the political structure. This defini-
tion, then, sets a lower bound or minimum
criterion for the existence of revolution.
Table 2 provides examples of the four
types of revolution. This table is not meant
to be exhaustive, but serves to provide a list-
ing of those revolutions judged by the
authors to be illustrative of the particular
categories.3 The dotted line in Column 1
separates successful mass revolutions from
those which were unsuccessful. In addition,
instances of both successful and unsuccess-
ful anti-colonial revolutions are included to
indicate the possible similarity of this type
to the general mass revolution. Having pro-
vided such illustrative material, a next step
is to provide the operational referents for
the examination of causes of revolution.
3 Other writers such as Gross (1958), Hunt-
ington (1962), and Silvert (1961) are in sub-
stantial agreement with this classification.
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Empirical Referents
Two of the four measures-duration and
domestic violence-may be interpreted as
defining characteristics of revolution, and
taken together may be seen as a measure of
revolutionary intensity.4 Domestic violence,
for example, is present in the majority of
revolutions. If the population is indifferent
to changes in the personnel of the govern-
mental elite, then a palace revolution may
be initiated by insurgents. They may en-
counter opposition only from the incumbent
elite. Because of the lack of large-scale,
organized conflict behavior, the number of
deaths would be at a minimum, and the
duration of such a revolution would be short.
If, however, the insurgents proclaim their
intention to initiate changes in the social
structure, then large segments of the popu-
lation may be alienated from the insurgent
cause. The number of deaths, and possibly
the duration of the revolution, may increase
proportionally to the degree of societal
change envisaged by the insurgents. Simi-
larly, the duration of a revolution has been
cited as a possible measure of revolutionary
TABLE 3
DEATHS AND DURATION FOR SUCCESSFUL
REVOLUTIONS, 1955-60
a The data sources for Column 1 are the raw data for
Rummel (1963), Tanter (1965), and the New York
Times. Two countries which experienced successful
revolutions, Sudan ( 1958 ) and Laos (1960), were
excluded because of missing data on deaths.
b Per million population, 1950-62 (Russett et al.,
1964, pp. 97-100).
c Data relevant to the duration of revolutions were
drawn from the New York Times.
d Both the 1957 and 1958 Thai revolts were initiated
by the same individual, the commander-in-chief of the
army, Sarit Thanarat. In addition, the 1958 coup took
place with the express agreement of the &dquo;ousted&dquo; Kitti-
kachom government. For these reasons, this latter in-
stance is omitted from the subsequent analysis although,
for the sake of completeness, it is included in this listing.
intensity (Rosenau, 1964, pp. 76-77). Many
Latin American palace revolutions are of
short duration, and the number killed is
relatively small. Indeed, bloodless coups
often occur in which no one is killed, but a
new set of elites assumes the major roles in
the political authority structure. Revolu-
tions such as the French and the Russian,
however, are of longer duration and a
greater number of persons are killed.
The two measures-duration and deaths
from domestic violence-are presented in
Table 3. The first column lists all success-
ful revolutions which occurred between
4 The degree of mass participation as well as
the intentions of the insurgents are less satisfac-
tory as empirical referents. Mass participation
might range from popular dissatisfaction with-
out direct involvement, on the one hand, to
overt complicity and active support of the in-
surgents, on the other. Thus, measurement of
mass participation presents a great deal of dif-
ficulty unless the researcher is present at the
site of the revolution and is able to measure
public opinion at the time the revolution takes
place. Similarly, the intentions of the insurgents,
although important as a descriptive variable,
nevertheless present important problems of mea-
surement. Intentions and ideological directions
are subject to changes during the process of
revolution. Fidel Castro, for example, pro-
claimed his support for the goals of the Cuban
middle class during the recent Cuban revolu-
tion, yet once in power he allied himself with
the Communists.
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1955 and 1960. The criterion for the in-
clusion of a revolution was that the revolt
ended sometime within that period.5 Col-
umn 2 lists the number killed as a result of
domestic group violence, per million popu-
lation. These figures are for the period
1950-62. An alternative would be to con-
struct an index on the basis of the number
killed during the period of the revolution
itself. However, the number killed during
a revolutionary coup lasting a few days may
not be indicative of the characteristics of
that revolution. For example, thirty persons
were killed during the Iraqi revolution of
1958. Two of these were the king, Faisal,
and his prime minister, Nuri. The intensity
of feeling against the government was mani-
fested when the populace dragged the king’s
body through the streets of Baghdad. The
death of thirty people would seem to be an
inadequate reflection of this degree of in-
tensity. However, if we examine the num-
ber of deaths prior to the revolution and
a f ter its occurrence, we find that Iraq ex-
perienced the second highest number of
deaths per million population of any revolu-
tion during the period 1955-60. Similarly,
Venezuela, which experienced the overthrow
of the Jiminez dictatorship, also had one of
the highest numbers of deaths as a result of
domestic violence. The inclusion of the
number of deaths prior to and after a revo-
lution might be indicative of the frustration
built up after a long period of repression.
A revolution generally occurs after a period
of instability, and it is suggested in this
paper that the form of a revolution is de-
pendent on the degree of political instability
which exists prior to its occurrence.
Two Correlates of Revolution
Having provided operational referents
for the concept of revolution, we may now
turn to an examination of possible correlates.
The problem of identifying the precondi-
tions of revolution has been of long concern
to political theorists. For example, Plato
(1951, p. 54) proposed that differences in
economic interests led to factionalism in
politics and contributed to the instability of
the city-state. Poverty, according to Plato,
produces revolution, meanness, and villainy,
while riches produce luxury, idleness, and
villainy. In substantial agreement with this
position, Aristotle (1962, p. 59) also pro-
posed that poverty may be a cause of politi-
cal revolution. Tocqueville (1955, pp. 22-
23), however, dissented from this emphasis
on poverty. He suggested that the French
peasant prior to 1789 enjoyed a considerably
higher degree of economic independence
than did the remainder of the European
peasantry. Because of this independence
and security, those aspects of feudalism still
remaining in French society, such as the
corvée (a form of periodic forced labor),
appeared all the more odious and con-
temptible.
Indeed, long-term economic depressions
were not present prior to the outbreaks of
either the American or Russian revolutions.
After an exhaustive study of four major
revolutions, Crane Brinton (1952, p. 264)
concluded that one uniformity in the oc-
currence of these revolutions was that the
societies under investigation were all on the
upgrade economically before the outbreak
of revolution. Some statistics relevant to the
5 The duration of a revolution is bounded by
two points in time: (1) when active hostilities
first broke out against the regime in power, and
(2) when the insurgents occupied the roles in
the structure of political authority. A period of
unrest prior to the victory of the insurgents was
included in the determination of the values in
Column 3. Riots and clashes between the police
and populace are examples of these disturbances.
In addition, if two or more changes in the per-
sonnel of the governmental elite took place
within a three-month period of time, the period
between changes was included in the duration.
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French economy prior to 1789 may be in-
structive. In the 6lectioit of Melun from
1783-85, the amount of uncultivated land
was reduced from 14,500 to 10,000 arpents.
Rouen in 1787 produced cotton cloth worth
50,000 livres, which was double the produc-
tion of a generation before. In the dozen
years since the death of Louis XIV, French
trade had increased nearly 100,000,000
livres (Brinton, 1952, p. 31).
The English Revolution of the 17th cen-
tury and the American Revolution were pre-
ceded by similar economic experiences. Ac-
cording to Brinton, early Stuart England
was notably prosperous, as were the Ameri-
can colonies prior to 1775 (1952, p. 32).
Russia also was making significant economic
progress prior to the outbreak of World War
I. Table 4 illustrates this growth in the
Russian economy.
The theories of Plato and Aristotle appear
to contradict those of Tocqueville and
Brinton. The first set asserts that poverty
leads to revolution while the second set
claims that revolutions are preceded by a
significant increase in economic develop-
ment. James C. Davies (1962, pp. 6-7) sug-
gests that a partial synthesis of these ap-
proaches may provide a more comprehensive
explanation than either of the two taken
alone; major revolutions may be preceded
by steady long-term increases in economic
development, followed by a sharp reversal
just before the outbreak of the revolution.
In more general terms, economic develop-
ment might be viewed as a single aspect of
a society’s achievement. That is, political,
economic, and cultural development may to-
gether comprise a single concept which, for
our purposes, may be called achievement.
A second concept closely associated with
achievement is termed aspirations. The re-
sults of political, economic, or cultural at-
tainment ordinarily are visible to the gen-
eral populace. Newly granted freedoms, as
TABLE 4
RUSSIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS PER CAPITA:
1895-1913a
a Mazour, 1962, p. 323.
well as roads, factories, museums, and a
higher standard of living, which generally
accompany a high rate of achievement, also
may tend to increase aspirations. It is posited
that the rates of change of the achievements
and aspirations are correlated. If achieve-
ment is increasing at a given rate, then the
populace would most likely aspire to the
acquisition of social commodities at the
same rate as they had been previously ac-
quired.
If we were to plot the increase in aspira-
tions over time, the slope (rate of change)
of this variable would approximate the rate
of change of achievement. The similarities
in the slope of the two plots is illustrated in
Figure 1. Now if, instead of increasing, the
rate of achievement were to decrease, we
may posit a third concept, expectations. The
rate of change of expectations would ap-
proximate that of the decrease in the rate of
achievement. Rates of expectations may be
affected more by immediate reality than are
rates of aspirations. Expectations represent
a change in outlook caused primarily by an
immediate decrease in the production of
social commodities. Aspirations are more in
the nature of a hope and an optimism gen-
erated by long-term past performance.6 The
distance between the two concepts (revolu-
6 The distinction between aspirations and ex-
pectations may be analogous to the Feierabends’
(1966, pp. 256-57) use of the terms "want
formation" and "want satisfaction."
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FIG. 1. Relationship between rate of achievement, aspirations, and expectations. (Adapted and
modified from Davies, 1962, p. 6.)
tionary gap) may be seen as a measure of
the potentiality for the occurrence of a vio-
lent revolution. The larger the revolutionary
gap, the longer and the more violent the
revolution may be. This hypothesis is repre-
sented in Figure 1.
As evidence for the low rate of expecta-
tions prior to major revolutions, Davies cites
the poor agricultural harvests of 1788-89 in
France which followed the economic ad-
vances of the prior decade. The English
economy had suffered a reversal prior to
1688, while there was a tightening up of
business conditions in America in 1774-75.
Conditions in Tsarist Russia in 1917 provide
a striking example of a breakdown in the
economic machinery immediately prior to
the outbreak of a revolution. Industrial pro-
duction had declined rapidly. Coal mining
had fallen to a level that threatened the
nation’s transportation. The peasants had
grown sick of the war, and instead of trans-
porting much-needed grain to Russia’s urban
centers, they were hoarding food in the ex-
pectation of future disasters. The economy
was in a state of virtual collapse when the
revolution broke out (Mazour, 1962, pp.
553-55). Apparently, these four major revo-
lutions provide evidence for Davies’ hy-
pothesis. But whether this hypothesis holds
true in all such instances is a question to be
investigated by means of a systematic analy-
sis across a larger universe of revolutions.
A second correlate of revolution might be
the level of educational attainment prior to
the outbreak of the disturbance. Seymour
M. Lipset (1959, pp. 73-80) has found that
the occurrence of revolutions is associated
negatively with the level of educational at-
tainment. Lipset categorized nations ac-
cording to their stability and degree of
democratic or totalitarian control and found
that Latin American dictatorships, which
are notoriously amenable to the occurrence
of palace revolutions, are also societies which
rank lowest on his scale of educational
attainment. Evidence supporting Lipset’s
finding is provided in the Dirnensions of 
Nations (Rummel, Sawyer, Tanter, and
Guetzkow, forthcoming, 1967). These
writers find that three educational variables
are correlated negatively with the occur-
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rence of revolution. One of the three-the
ratio of number enrolled in primary schools
to the total population aged 5-14-gave the
highest negative correlation (r = -.84, N =
66). It appears from the data of the mid-
1950s that revolutions will occur more fre-
quently in societies with the lowest levels
of educational attainment.
Having stated the principal concepts and
their measures, it may be useful to summa-
rize the definitions prior to a presentation of
the results:
( 1 ) A revolution is operationally defined
by domestic violence and duration.
(2) Achievement and aspirations are de-
fined by the rate of change of GNP/CAP
over time (gross national product divided by
population).
(3) Expectations are defined by the drop
or reversal in the rate of change of GNP/
CAP.
(4) Educational level is defined by the
primary school ratio-number enrolled in
primary school divided by total population
aged 5-14.
Given these definitions, the following hy-
potheses are suggested:
(1) The higher the rate of increase of
GNP/CAP preceding the revolution and the
sharper the reversal immediately prior to
the revolution, the greater the duration and
violence of the revolution.
(2) The lower the level of educational at-
tainment prior to the revolution, the greater
the duration and violence of the revolution.
These hypotheses were tested across
seventeen cases of successful revolutions for
1955-60.
Data and Results
Data for the years 1955-60 are presented
in Table 5. Unsuccessful and colonial revo-
lutions are excluded. The variation over
TABLE 5
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TIME RATE OF CHANGE OF
GNP/CAP, AND PRIMARY ENROLLMENT RATIO
a Same variable as in Table 3, Column 2.
b The sources for this data column are the UN Sta-
tistical Yearbooks, 1955-1962. The data are presented
in time-series form with base year 1953 = 100.
C Primary enrollment divided by total population
aged 5-14. These ratios were drawn from the World
Survey of Education II, UNESCO, 1958, Table 15, pp.
58-60. The majority of these values are for the years
1950-1954, with Brazil, Cuba, and Iraq for 1950-
1953, Haiti and Jordan for 1952-1954, and Turkey for
1950-1952.
d The rate of change of GNP/CAP for Cuba can be
seen in Figure 2.
. The values for Iraq and El Salvador were not
included in the standardized tabular form in the data
sources, and were therefore calculated separately by
means of net national product and population data.
f The values for Syria and Thailand are based on
four and six data points respectively, due to limited
data availability.
g The dashes in the columns indicate that the data
were not available.
time in GNP/CAP is presented in Column
3. The figures in this column are regression
coefficients which were calculated for the
seven-year period preceding each revolu-
tion.7 Here, the regression coefficient is a
7 The period of seven years prior to the out-
break of the revolution is an arbitrary choice,
determined chiefly by the availability of com-
parable data. It is possible that the investiga-
tion of longer periods might yield different re-
sults.
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quantitative representation of a given vari-
able’s rate of change over time ( slope ) .8
Gross national product per capita was
plotted against time for each nation, and
the slopes were approximately linear. The
values of these coefficients are comparable,
since the same base year (1953 = 100) was
chosen for all cases.9 Column 4 lists the pri-
mary school ratios.
The product-moment correlation coeffi-
cients are presented in Table 6. These co-
efficients were calculated first for the total
number of cases in Column 1, and then
separately for the Asian and Latin American
cases. The number of cases on which each
coefficient is based is written in parentheses
below the value of that coefficient. Before
calculating the coefficients, curves were
TABLE 6
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN CHANGES
IN WEALTH, LEVEL OF EDUCATION, AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCEa
a Domestic violence was logarithmically transformed
for the first two values in the second row. No trans-
formations were necessary for the calculation of the
remaining values.
The dependent variable in the calculation of these
coefficients was domestic violence.
plotted and, where necessary, domestic vio-
lence was logarithmically transformed to
compensate for the effect of an outlier
( Cuba ) .
Since these calculations are based on an
entire population of revolutions in the given
period, it must be noted that the sample of
cases is not random. Although the conven-
tional significance levels are thus not ap-
plicable, they are utilized to provide some
criterion for the tenability of hypotheses.
All correlation coefficients are considered
significant at the .05 level of confidence;
i.e., five times in 100 the coefficient could
be due to chance. A second interpretation
of the correlation coefficient is the percent-
age of variance explained-the square of
the coefficient. This mode of presentation is
also employed in the following discussion.
The values in the first two data columns
of Table 6 are statistically nonsignificant.
The figures in Column 3, however, are some-
what more indicative of the presence of re-
lationships. As Hayward R. Alker (Russett
et al., 1964, pp. 322-23) has suggested, cul-
tural differences between regions may ac-
count for an apparent lack of significant re-
lationships. When the total number of cases
is considered, domestic violence in Asian
countries in general, and Middle Eastern
8 The data in Table 5 are presented with cer-
tain reservations. The regression coefficients in
the second data column were calculated from
UN statistical yearbooks, and in that source it is
noted that gross national product data are in-
dicative only of general trends. Indeed, different
yearbooks reported varying values of GNP/CAP
for the same country and the same year. In
order to partially resolve these inconsistencies,
the regression coefficients were calculated using
a single time series (from one yearbook) for each
coefficient. In addition, the criterion for choos-
ing a time series was that it was reported in the
yearbook published one year subsequent to the
occurrence of the revolution (e.g., the 1959
Yearbook for Pakistan [1958]). For those cases
in which the time series was incomplete, such
as Syria or Thailand, a subsequent yearbook
was chosen which contained the most complete
time series.
9 The term "base year" refers to the basis of
the UN Statistical Yearbook’s calculation of the
time-series figures. In all of the series, 1953 is
set equal to 100 and the values for the other
years are expressed relative to that year. This
term does not refer to the starting point for the
calculation of the regression coefficients. The
choice of a starting year for the calculation of
these coefficients is based solely on the fact that
the chosen year is seven years prior to the out-
break of the revolution.
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countries in particular, may have an entirely
different political meaning from the same
degree of violence in Latin American coun-
tries. This division of the countries in Table
5 into Latin American, Asian, and Middle
Eastern is a first approximation to a control
for cultural differences. Only France, of the
countries included in Table 5, did not fall
into any one of these categories.
When Asian revolutions are considered,
we find that the degree of association be-
tween rate of change of GNP/CAP and
domestic violence is significant at p < .01 
and accounts for approximately 88 percent
of the variance. The proportion of students
enrolled in primary schools is correlated
negatively with domestic violence, and the
coefficient is nonsignificant at p < .10. Ap-
proximately 58 percent of the variance is
accounted for by this relationship. For the
Middle Eastern countries, the correlation
between the rate of change of GNP/CAP
and domestic violence is significant at p <
.05 and accounts for approximately 92 per-
cent of the variance. The rate of change of
GNP/CAP prior to the revolution is almost
perfectly associated with the level of domes-
tic violence. The correlation between the
primary enrollment ratio and domestic vio-
lence is nonsignificant at p < .10 and ac-
counts for 85 percent of the variance.
The coefficients for the Asian and Middle
Eastern revolutions appear to provide some
of the explanation of variance for all
the cases. However, because of the small
number of cases, these results should be ac-
cepted with caution. Before we can assume
that 92 percent of the variation of domestic
violence in the Middle East is accounted for
by the rate of change of economic develop-
ment, we clearly must have further verifica-
tion efforts based on a longer time-period.
Deaths from domestic violence is one
measure of revolution; another is the num-
ber of days of the revolution. A set of cor-
relation coefficients was calculated for dura-
tion, the rate of change of GNP/CAP, and
the level of the primary enrollment ratio;
the results were not significant at p < .05.
Perhaps one reason for this lack of a rela-
tionship is the extreme difficulty in mea-
suring duration. As Brinton (1952, pp. 238-
50) notes in his study of the Russian Revolu-
tion, the notion of duration may be better
suited to the making of qualitative judg-
ments rather than quantitative distinctions.
For example, there is a large degree of un-
certainty as to the duration of the Russian
Revolution. On the one hand, the period in
the early 1920s may be viewed as a &dquo;Ther-
midor,&dquo; hence a denouement of the revolu-
tion. Later, on the other hand, the Soviet
Union under Stalin experienced a reign of
terror which rivalled the intensity of the
French Revolution at its height. The Soviets
may have undergone a &dquo;permanent revolu-
tion&dquo; throughout the Stalin period, and only
after Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin
did the revolution subside into a period of
normalcy. Thus there are at least two possi-
ble measures of the duration of the Russian
Revolution. In his attempt to define the
duration of the English Revolution, Brinton
encountered similar difficulties. Because of
the close-knit series of events prior to the
outbreak of the Civil War in 1642, the dura-
tion of this revolution is essentially a matter
of subjective determination (Brinton, 1952,
p. 75).
Brinton’s analysis and the results of this
study suggest that the duration variable is
difficult to measure. Moreover, when com-
paring durations we often commit the fallacy
of employing different units of analysis in
the same investigation. By recording dura-
tions we are, in effect, ignoring the events
which occurred during these periods. A
three-day revolutionary coup which is fought
with bitter intensity should not be equated
with a three-day palace revolution which is
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FIG. 2. Plot of gross national product per capita (GNP/CAP) versus time for Cuba, 1947-53. (In
the construction of this figure, the inception of the Cuban revolution was taken to be Castro’s first
armed landing in 1953.)
bloodless and leads only to a change in the
personnel of the governmental elite. A more
adequate measure might be the number of
events of a similar type compressed into a
given time-interval. Rather than treating
duration as a continuous variable, however,
we may more profitably view it as discrete
at a given threshold. Below a certain value
of this variable, the duration of a revolution
may be irrelevant to the explanation of
either the antecedents or the consequences
of its occurrence. Above that value, the
duration of a revolution may be a meaning-
ful characteristic.
The longer the revolution persists, the
greater the polarization of the society around
the warring factions. Traditional associa-
tions are broken. Factions which at the
start of the conflict might have been able to
settle their differences by negotiation now
find that, with the passage of time, enmities
have increased to the extent that only un-
conditional surrender by one of the factions
can terminate the revolution. Reference to
Table 3 reveals that the Cuban revolution,
with a duration of six years, is at the same
time the only instance of mass revolution in
the chosen period. The duration of the
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Cuban revolution is more than ten times
greater than any of the other values in Col-
umn 3, and the &dquo;threshold&dquo; may be some-
where between one and five years. Future
attempts at the determination of this value
may be fruitful for a better explanation of
the revolutionary process.
A Mass Revolution: The Case of Cuba
We may recall that Davies’ hypothesis
suggests that the higher the long-term rate
of achievement and aspirations preceding
the revolution, and the sharper the reversal
(expectations) immediately prior to the revo-
lution, the greater the intensity as measured
by duration and domestic violence. Rate of
achievement is defined as rate of change of
GNP/CAP, whereas the reversal is equated
with expectations. The rate of change of
GNP/CAP for Cuba was not included in
Table 5. Instead, Figure 2 plots GNP/CAP
against time for the seven-year period pre-
ceding Castro’s first armed incursion against
Batista in 1953.
If we compare Figure 1 (p. 271) with
Figure 2 we see a marked similarity. A
high rate of achievement is followed by a
reversal which, according to the theory, cor-
responds to the expectation of the society.
In addition, the Cuban revolution, with
2,900 deaths per million and a duration of
six years, falls into the mass revolution cate-
gory-the only instance of such a revolution
in the period 1955-60. Although Cuba is a
single case, it compares favorably with
Brinton’s analysis, in that the four countries
in his study experienced economic condi-
tions similar to that of Cuba prior to the
onset of revolution.
The Cuban revolution is the only instance
in the period under consideration where a
severe reversal actually occurred immedi-
ately prior to the revolution. We thus find
a confirmation of the existence of a &dquo;revolu-
tionary gap&dquo; in the Cuban example-our
one example of a mass revolution-but are
left without an adequate test for the other
instances of revolution. How do we mea-
sure expectations in cases of revolutionary
coups, reform coups, and palace revolutions?
Differences in Expectations: The
Gini Index
An operational definition of expectations
might be the degree of inequality in income
or land distribution.10 If the rate of achieve-
ment is high and unequally distributed, large
sectors of the population might be aroused
by this appearance of new wealth in a
limited segment of the population. Aspira-
tions, which are based on long-term achieve-
ments, may tend to be higher, whereas ex-
pectations-more a function of immediate
reality-might be lower because of the pre-
vailing economic inequalities. Where the
&dquo;revolutionary gap&dquo; between aspirations and
expectations is largely due to a high level of
inequality in land distribution, we would ex-
pect an increase in the probability of revolu-
tion.
The Gini index is a measure of inequality.
It measures the area between the Lorenz
curve of any distribution and the line of per-
fect equality. For high inequality, the area
between the Lorenz curve and the line of
perfect equality would be correspondingly
large; hence, the Gini index would also have
a large value. For lower degrees of in-
equality, the reverse is true.
Table 7 presents the Gini indices for all
nations included in the data source (Russett
et al., 1964 p., 239ft). Table 7 (a) lists the
values for nations which experienced suc-
cessful revolutions in the period 1955-60,
whereas Table 7 ( b) presents the values for
10 It should be noted that this treatment of
"expectations" is cross-sectional in design, as
opposed to the longitudinal nature of Davies’
theory.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XI NUMBER 3
277
those nations which did not have successful
revolutions. The indices are for land, whose
distribution is probably correlated with in-
come distribution. A one-tailed t-test of the
significance of difference was performed
and a t equal to 2.641 was calculated. With
48 degrees of freedom, this value is signifi-
cant at p < .05. Thus degree of land in-
equality might be interpreted as an opera-
tional form of expectations; at any rate,
revolutions occurred in those societies with
a higher degree of land inequality. Russett
(1964, p. 272) also reports a relationship
between the Gini index of land inequality
and domestic violence of r = .44 across 44
cases.
Conclusions
The analysis of inequalities of land distri-
bution and the Cuban case study provide
empirical support for the hypothesized rela-
tionship between the revolutionary gap and
the domestic violence characteristic of revo-
lutions. However, while the correlational
analysis provides support for the hypothesis
in the case of Asian revolutions, it was not
substantiated for Latin American revolutions
in this period.
The results suggest two alternatives: (1)
If we assume that the level of domestic vio-
lence is indeed an indicator of the type of
revolution in Latin America, then we are
forced to conclude that in Latin America
there is virtually no relationship between
the rate of change of GNP/CAP and the
form of revolution. This alternative leads to
a reliance on an explanation based on re-
gional differences. (2) If we assume that
domestic violence bears little relationship to
the palace revolution in Latin America (most
of the Latin American revolutions in Table
5 are of the palace variety), then the rela-
tionship between the rate of change of
GNP/CAP and the other forms of revolu-
tion is not invalidated. Those revolutions
TABLE 7
GINI INDICES OF LAND INEQUALITY’
a From Russett et al., 1964, pp. 239-40.
occurring in Asia are either reform coups
or revolutionary coups; thus we may suggest
that the palace revolution is little affected
by domestic group violence, whereas the
other forms of revolution may indeed be so
affected. The rate of change of GNP/CAP
and level of education may then be theoreti-
cally significant for the study of revolutions
other than the palace variety. Now we may
ask why the palace revolution should be
relatively unaffected by domestic violence.
George Blanksten (1958, p. 143) has sug-
gested that one reason for the repeated
&dquo;palace revolutions&dquo; in Latin America is that
the class-oriented social structure provides
the upper class with a virtual monopoly
of participation in the political authority.
Indians are almost entirely excluded from
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participation in politics, and the mestizos
(descendants of Spanish-Indian marriages)
are also inactive in politics but emerge at
times as followers of a particular political
faction. Class distinctions in Latin America
then act as a relatively impermeable barrier
between the elite (the socioeconomic class
from which holders of high political office
are drawn) and the mass (all those who are
excluded from this highest socioeconomic
category). Because of this barrier, distur-
bances in the society may seldom affect the
&dquo;normal&dquo; operations of government in most
Latin American nations. Thus palace revo-
lutions may frequently take place uncon-
nected with violent changes within the so-
ciety. We find that the rate of change of
GNP/CAP bears little or no relationship to
domestic violence in Latin America, but-
at the same time-domestic violence bears
little relationship to the palace revolution,
which until now has been the most frequent
form of revolution in this region.
The Asian countries included in this study
may not experience the same degree of class
rigidity as do the Latin American nations.
Barriers between the mass and the elite
might not be so rigid or impermeable.
Therefore, economic changes which affect
domestic violence also have an effect on the
form of the revolution. A similar argument
can be developed for the effect of education
on the form of revolution. As a general
proposition we suggest that the more im-
permeable the barriers between the mass
and the elite, the less the effect of domestic
violence on the form of revolution. The con-
verse may be equally valid. The more per-
meable the barriers between the mass and
the elite, the greater the effect of mass activ-
ity on the form of revolution.
The social structure of France prior to
1789 provides an example of these relation-
ships. According to Tocqueville (1955, pp.
97-108) the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries witnessed a hardening of class
lines between the nobility, the small but
growing bourgeoisie, and the peasantry. Be-
fore 1780, class lines had become so rigid
that Tocqueville referred to the nobility as
a caste within the general class structure of
French society. We may also note that
France during this period was free of revo-
lutionary disturbances. At the same time,
the English were thought of as politically
unstable, whereas the French were consid-
ered to be fortunate in having a government
which exemplified political stability.
In the decade prior to 1789, however,
there was a significant decrease in the rigid-
ity of barriers between classes. Local parle-
ments were once again assigned a political
function which they had virtually relin-
quished centuries before. The meetings of
the parlements provided a social setting for
this increasing fluidity across class lines.
The case of the French Revolution may
provide a comparison within a single coun-
try : during one period, barriers between the
elite and the mass prevented social distur-
bances from disrupting the &dquo;normal&dquo; opera-
tions of government; later, according to
Tocqueville, this barrier became increasingly
permeable and mass revolution occurred.
Recent theories of mass society have also
emphasized the importance of the relation-
ship between the elite and the mass. LeBon
(1947, pp. 214 f f ) and Ortega y Gassett
(1940, pp. 97 f f ) stress that for the govern-
mental elite to perform its proper function
of judicious decision-making, it should be
protected from the effects of mass persua-
sion, which frequently manifests itself in
violent forms. On the other hand, Hannah
Arendt’s view (1958, pp. 315-24) is that
the mass, if unprotected from the elite, may
undergo a process of &dquo;atomization&dquo; in which
individuals are dissociated from each other
and become easy prey for the totalitarian
designs of the elite.
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William Kornhauser (1959, pp. 39 f f )
suggests that if organized group activity in a
pluralistic society can act as an intermediary
between the elite and the mass, then neither
will be accessible to undue penetration by
the other. The intermediary group associa-
tions can then be viewed as a second form
of the social barrier between the elite and
the mass.
Both notions, that of class distinctions
and that of the pluralistic group process,
may be amenable to future research as to
their effect on the incidence and form of
revolution. With the possible exception of
France, none of the countries in Table 5
have strongly developed pluralistic societies.
However, the state of their pluralistic de-
velopment may be related to the form of
revolution.
Finally, what do these results and our in-
terpretation say for the scheme of classifica-
tion of revolutions presented initially? That
is, we suggested that revolutions may fall
on a rank-order: mass revolution, revolution-
ary coup, reform coup, and palace revolu-
tion. In Asian societies, such an ordering
was suggested by the relationship between
changes in wealth, in educational level, and
in domestic violence. Latin American so-
cieties, with a preponderance of palace revo-
lutions, did not exhibit these relationships.
The palace revolution appears, then, to be
a breed apart from the others.
Our definition was predicated on the
palace revolution as a lower bound above
which lies a rank-order or continuum of
more intense changes in both government
and society. Since the data appear to ex-
clude the palace revolution from the con-
cept of a continuum, the definition might
have to be revised so that the &dquo;lower bound&dquo;
is raised and the palace revolution is ex-
cluded from the definition.
This would appear reasonable if we exam-
ine the insurgents’ orientations. A continuum
of revolution is essentially one of commit-
ment to change. Revolutions are not pieces
of historical machinery, as the Hegelians or
Marxists may contend, but are deeply asso-
ciated with the ideological orientations of
the participants. Indeed, this study suggests
that domestic violence may vary with the
degree of change intended by the insurgents.
Therefore, the continuum we speak of is
essentially a continuum of human desires for
change, which-translated into a specific
form of political action-make a revolution.
The insurgents in a palace revolution, how-
ever, intend only to occupy roles in the
existing authority structure. Changes in the
social system or in the structure of political
authority are not included in their program.
Thus, if we are measuring a continuum of
political and social change, the palace revo-
lution may not contribute to these measure-
ments.
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